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ATTACHED TO THE FORM U-5 SHOULD
REFLECT THE REALITIES
OF THE WORKPLACE
DAYNA B. TANN
INTRODUCTION

As the stock market plunged, Ahmad Baravati, an account
executive in the Chicago branch of a New York securities dealer,
scrambled to respond to his panicking clients.' Despite his
requests to cancel his client's stock interests, several of his
clients nevertheless remained on the company's purchase list.2
His countless attempts to rectify the situation were ignored by
his supervisors.3 Finally, after consulting with a securities
attorney about the matter, Baravati was promptly fired.4 To his
surprise, his termination form falsely stated that he was fired for
"wrongful taking of firm property."5 In response, Baravati filed
an arbitration claim for defamation with the NASD.'
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John'sLaw Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., 2005, The University of Scranton.
' See Baravati v. Josephthal Lyon & Ross Inc., 834 F. Supp 1023, 1025 (N.D. Ill.
1993), affd, 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
2 Id. Regardless of Baravati's notification to his office manager, the names of his
clients remained on the company's list to purchase stock that the clients previously
requested to cancel. Id.
3Id.
4 Id. at 1026.

5 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
6 Id. "NASD" is an acronym for the National Association of Securities Dealers.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1050 (8th ed. 2004). The NASD is a "self-regulatory

organization that oversees the registration, compliance and activities of member
brokerage firms." Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming,
Organizing and Operatinga Mutual Fund: Legal and Practical Considerations,in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES: THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 9, 32 n.34 (2007). But cf About the Financial

Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2009) (noting that in July 2007, the NASD and "the member
regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange"
consolidated to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")-the
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Fortunately for Baravati, an NASD arbitration panel rejected his
employer's absolute immunity defense and awarded him
damages on the basis that he was maliciously defamed for
blowing the whistle on the company's fraud.7
Today, brokers like Baravati may not have such good
fortune. In Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc.,8 the New York Court of
Appeals granted brokerage firms absolute immunity from
liability for statements published on the Form U-5. 9 As a result
of this decision, many brokers are seemingly defenseless against
their employers' malicious attempts to retaliate against them.
A securities broker's termination form is what is known in
the securities industry as the Form U-5 (the Uniform
Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration).1 This
form is filed in a central reporting system governed by FINRA."
Under this system, an employer is required to file a form
whenever an employee associated with such self-regulatory
organization is either registered or terminated as an investment
broker. 2 The Form U-4 (the Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration or Transfer) is the official form to register
individuals with FINRA.' 3 The Form4 U-5, by contrast, is the
official form to terminate employment.
"largest non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the
United States").
7 See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
The arbitrators concluded that the broker's termination resulted from Baravati's
consultation with an SEC attorney about the company's refusal to release clients
from the company's stock-purchase list. Id. at 705-06.
8 8 N.Y.3d 359, 866 N.E.2d 439, 834 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2007).
9 Id. at 361-62, 866 N.E.2d at 440, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
10 See Jeffrey L. Liddle & Ethan A. Brecher, Form U-5 Defamation Claims: The
End of the Line? Not So Fast, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2007: ARBITRATORS
AND MEDIATORS-WINNING THEIR HEARTS AND MINDS 673, 677 (2007).
11 Id.; see About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 6
(explaining that FINRA encompasses the NASD and the regulation and enforcement
functions of the New York Stock Exchange).
12 See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 677-78; see also Seth Taube,
Regulatory Reporting Requirements, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 20-3 (2009)
(noting that the employer has a mandatory requirement to file the Form U-4 and
Form U-5).
13 See Taube, supra note 12.
'4 Id. at 20-4. The Forms U-4 and U-5 regulate all employees associated with
FINRA. See Bruce Schaeffer, Defamation and Form U-5, in PRACTISING LAW

INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: SECURITIES

ARBITRATION 553, 558-59 (1997) (referring to the regulatory authority of the NASD
before it was folded into FINRA). Accordingly, stockbrokers are not the only ones
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The Form U-5 is comprised of a series of questions
addressing the reasons for an investment broker's termination. 15
After completion, the employer must file the form in a central
registration system that is available for review by any member
firm 1 6 and, in some instances, the general investing public. 7 As
one can imagine, even one negative statement on the Form U-5
may hamper the broker's job opportunities.' 8 In fact, most big
brokerage firms "take a pass" on brokers with more than one
complaint on their Form U-5.19 As a result, "[fiormer employees
who are dissatisfied with the information" on this form "often
assert defamation claims in the context of a wrongful
termination."2 0
Privilege is a defense to defamation; however, the degree of
privilege afforded to the Form U-5 varies among the states.2 '
States have generally implemented either an absolute or
qualified privilege.2 2 An absolute privilege protects an employer
from liability regardless of motive,2 3 while a qualified privilege
may be "vitiated upon a showing that the communication was
made with actual malice." 24 Traditionally implemented on public
who initiate defamation suits arising from statements on these forms. Any
registered brokerage house personnel-including financial planners and investment
advisors-may bring such a claim. Id. at 558.
15 FINRA,
FORM U-5: UNIFORM TERMINATION NOTICE FOR SECURITIES
INDUSTRY REGISTRATION 5 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter FINRA FORM U-5I, available at
http://www.finra.orgweb/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportd
ocs/p015114.pdf.
16 See Anne H. Wright, Form U-5 Defamation, 52 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1299,
1305 n.22 (1995).
11See infra text accompanying notes 51-60 for a discussion of "BrokerCheck."
18 See Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998).
19 See Karen Donovan, A License To Lie, REGISTERED REP., May 1, 2007, at 51.
20 See Thomas J. Kavaler, Thomas M. Campbell, Robert J. Rubinson & Marcy A.
Siskind, An Overview of Industry Arbitration, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 669, 704 (1991).
21 Compare Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 362, 866 N.E.2d 439, 440,
834 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (2007) (applying an absolute privilege to the Form U-5), with
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
a qualified privilege to the Form U-5).
22 See Schaeffer, supra note 14, at 563.
23 See Adam J. Safer, Absolute Immunity for U-5 Statements, N.Y. L.J., June 5,
2007, at 4.
24 Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman (In re N.Y. Stock Exch. Arbitration), 935 F.2d
512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Garson v. Hendlin, 141 A.D.2d 55, 64-65, 532
N.Y.S.2d 776, 782 (2d Dep't 1988) (establishing that an allegation of malice requires
demonstration of "personal spite, ill will or culpable recklessness").
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policy grounds, the absolute privilege "insure[s] freedom of
speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should
exist."2 5 As a result, the privilege extends to "all persons
participating in judicial proceedings."2 6 Many states have now
extended this privilege to quasi-judicial proceedings.
Proponents of the absolute privilege argue that the filing of a
Form U-5 constitutes a "preliminary step" in a quasi-judicial
proceeding.28
Accordingly, they conclude that the absolute
privilege that typically attaches to such proceedings shall also
extend to the Form U-5.29 In contrast, those in support of a
qualified privilege contend that the Form U-5 is not a
preliminary step in the quasi-judicial process, but rather is a
mere filing formality. 0 They agree that there is a crucial interest
in protecting the public against unscrupulous brokers; yet they
nevertheless maintain that the grant of absolute immunity is an
extreme remedy.'
This Note will evaluate the hotly contested legal debate
concerning the degree of privilege afforded to statements made
on the Form U-5 and the impact on the securities industry of
New York's recent decision in Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc. Part I
provides an overview of the Form U-5 and its filing formalities.
Part II offers a brief outline of defamation and details the policies
behind the absolute and qualified privilege. Part III describes
the case history that led to New York's decision and the impact of
that decision on the industry as a whole. Part IV argues that the
qualified privilege is the "wiser policy"32 because it balances both
the public's entitlement to disclosure and the employee's right to
seek redress for untruthful statements.
25 Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:JudicialProceedings,
9 CoLUM. L. REV. 463, 469 (1909).
26 Id.
27 Joshua B. Orenstein, Absolute Privilege from Defamation Claims and the
Devaluing of Teachers' Professional Reputations, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 261, 263-64

(2005); see also VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT

LAW 1022 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that arbitration hearings and proceedings conducted
by administrative agencies constitute quasi-judicial proceedings).
28 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 364, 866 N.E.2d 439, 442,
834 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (2007).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994).
1 See id.; see also Wright, supra note 16, at 1302.
22 See Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FORM U-5
The Form U-5 is the official form to file a broker's
termination. 3 Brokerage firms must file this form with FINRA's
Central Registration Depository ("CRD") within thirty days of the
broker's dismissal.3 4 The employer must also provide the broker
with a copy. 3 The broker is then given the opportunity to submit
a written response that is filed along with the form. 6
Additionally, the employer is required to file any subsequent
amendments within thirty days.3
Sections 3 and 7 of the Form U-5 provide the basis for most
defamation actions. 38 Section 3 inquires into the general reasons
for termination, and section 7 concerns disclosure questions. 9
Under section 3, an employer must check a box indicating
whether the employee's termination is classified as: "Voluntary,"
40
"Deceased," "Permitted to Resign," "Discharged," or "Other." If
any of the last three are indicated, an explanation is required. 4 '
Section 7 is a lengthier section comprised of a series of "yes" or
"no" questions relating to the disclosure of investigations,4 2
internal review, 43 criminal convictions," regulatory actions,45

3' See

FINRA, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM U-5: UNIFORM TERMINATION NOTICE
INDUSTRY REGISTRATION 1 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter FINRA,

FOR SECURITIES

INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM U-5], available at httpJ/www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/
@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/appsupportdocs/pOl5ll3.pdf. See also FINRA FORM U5, supra note 15.
31 See Kavaler, Campbell, Rubinson & Siskind, supra note 20, at 701
(citing NYSE, Inc., Rules § 345.17(a) (2009), available at http://www.nyse
.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=http://rules.nyse.comNYSE/Help/Map/rules-sys
355.html) (describing the requirement before the NASD folded into FINRA).
31 See id.
36 See Frederick Wertheim, Broker-Dealerand Associated Person Registration,in
1 BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 2:3.4 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed. 2008).
31 See Taube, supra note 12, at § 20:2.1.
38 See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 680-81.
39 See FINRA FORM U-5, supra, note 15, at 1, 5.
40Id. at 1.
41 Id.

42 See Question 7A on the Form U-5. Id. at 5 (inquiring whether the individual
was the "subject of an investigation or proceeding by a domestic or foreign
governmental body or self-regulatory organization with jurisdiction over investmentrelated businesses").
I' See Question 7B on the Form U-5. Id. (inquiring as to whether the individual
was or is "under internal review for fraud or wrongful taking of property, or
violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or industry standards of
conduct").
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customer
complaints, 46
and
terminations
regarding
4
resignations. 7 A caution in red capital letters at the top of the
section mandates that "if the answer to any of the following
questions in section 7 is 'yes', complete details of all events or
proceedings on appropriate DRP(s)." 48 The Internal Review
Disclosure Reporting Page ("DRP") is then attached and
submitted to the CRD along with the Form U-5.49
Member firms have access to the CRD and are required to
review the Form U-5 before making any hiring decisions.5"
Additionally, the investing public has indirect access to certain
information provided on the form through the CRD component,
"BrokerCheck."5'
BrokerCheck is a tool designed to "help
investors check the professional background of current and
former FINRA-registered securities firms and brokers" and to aid
them in their decision "whether to do business with a particular
broker or brokerage."5 2
Through this program, the NASD
releases "disclosure information" relating to criminal actions,
civil actions, customer complaints, and securities-related
terminations provided on the Form U-4.5 3
Nevertheless,
44 See Question 7C on the Form U-5. Id. (inquiring as to whether the individual
was ever convicted or pleaded guilty to a felony or was convicted or pleaded guilty to
a misdemeanor in "investment-relatedbusiness").
45 See Question 7D on the Form U-5. Id. (inquiring as to whether the individual
was ever involved in any disciplinary action with jurisdiction over "investmentrelated businesses").
46 See Question 7E on the Form U-5. Id. (inquiring as to whether the individual
was ever named as a representative or defendant in one or more "sales practice
violations" that are still pending, resulted in a judgment or arbitration award
against the defendant, or were settled for an amount of $10,000 or more).
"7See Question 7F on the Form U-5. Id. (inquiring as to whether the individual
resigned or was permitted to resign from the firm after allegations that the
individual was involved in violating investment-related regulations, wrongful taking
of property, or failure to supervise in connection with investment-related
regulations).
I Id. (original text appears entirely in capital letters); see also FINRA,

INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM U-5, supra note 33. "DRP" stands for "Disclosure Reporting

Page(s)." Id.
49 See Schaeffer, supra note 14, at 561.
50 See id.
51 See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 362 n.3, 866 N.E.2d 439,
441
n.3, 834 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 n.3 (2007).
52 FINRA BrokerCheck, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/Broker
Check/p085698 (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
" See Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 362 n.3, 866 N.E.2d at 441 n.3, 834 N.Y.S.2d at
496 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The NASD originally released this
information through e-mail; however, in March 2007, the SEC expanded the
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information from the Form U-5 may still indirectly appear on
BrokerCheck.54 This is possible through the broker's responses to
questions on the Form U-4 pertaining to prior employment. 5 For
example, question 14J on the Form U-4 requires a broker to state
whether his discharge resulted from allegations of "violating
investment-related statutes, regulations, rules, or industry
standards."5 6 The response to this question will then be subject
to disclosure through BrokerCheck.
In March 2007, the SEC expanded the availability of
information to the investing public.55
Notably, "Historic
Complaints" (that is, customer complaints, arbitrations or
litigations) before March 19, 2007, became available for review
through BrokerCheck.5 9 The NASD, however, assured brokers
that although it would release information published on the
Form U-5, it would not disclose information relating to "Internal
Review Disclosure" in section 7 or "Reason for Termination"
information reported in section 3.60
As a result of the disclosure permitted by BrokerCheck, any
negative comment on a broker's Form U-5 may cause the broker
to lose prospective or current clients. 6 ' Such a comment may also
provide the basis for an employer's refusal to hire the broker.62
Nonetheless, the broker has little recourse. Before registering
with FINRA, a securities broker must sign an arbitration
agreement included in the Form U-4 in which the broker
"agree[s] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may
arise between [the broker] and [his] firm, or a customer, or any

availability of information and provided instantaneous retrieval of the information
without first making an e-mail request. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
" Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 362 n.3, 866 N.E.2d at 441 n.3, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 496
n.3.
55 Id.
56 Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57 Id.

" See Press Release, FINRA, New, Improved NASD BrokerCheck Goes Live
Online Today (Mar. 19 2007), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/
2007/P018835.
-9See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 3 (Feb. 2007), http://www.finra.org/web/
groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p018666.pdf.
See id.

8'See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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other person."6 3 As a result of this agreement, the broker is left
with limited options-to initiate a defamation action or simply do
nothing and ultimately concede that the remarks are true.

II.

DEFAMATION DEFENSES: QUALIFIED AND ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY

Undoubtedly, a false statement on a broker's Form U-5
constitutes an act of defamation. A defamatory communication is
a statement that "tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or
avoided.... [Ilt necessarily... involves the idea of disgrace. " '
Generally, to establish an actionable defamation claim, there
must exist defamatory language on the part of the defendant that
is "of or concerning the plaintiff," publication of this language by
the defendant to a third person, and damage to the reputation of
the plaintiff.6"
A false accusation leading to a broker's termination is
defamatory language that impairs the "reputation of [a]
tradesm[an]."66 "The law has always been very tender of the
reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in
the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be
actionable in the case of another person."67 Furthermore, given
that the employer is the only one who is permitted to submit the
Form, 68 the defamatory language is certainly "on the part of the
defendant." Additionally, the Form U-5 is comprised of a series
of questions inquiring into a particular broker's performance,6 9
and therefore, is necessarily "of or concerning the plaintiff."
Moreover, the Form U-5 undeniably passes the publication
requirement given that the Form U-5 is filed with a central
registry system that is available for review by all member

" See FINRA, FORM U-4: UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR SECURITIES INDUSTRY
REGISTRATION OR TRANSFER 13 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter FINRA, FORM U-41,
availableat http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/
appsupportdocs/p015112.pdf.
64

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 111 (5th ed. 1984).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 112.
67 Id. § 112.
6 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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firms. 70 Finally, a false statement on the Form U-5 damages the
reputation of the plaintiff who may lose clients or fail to attain
employment as a result of the statement.7
Nevertheless, there are several defenses to a defamation
claim. Truth is an absolute defense.7 2 Quite simply, truthful
statements are not defamatory. 3 Statements may also be
immune by privilege. 4
Whether a statement is privileged
depends upon whether the defendant is acting in furtherance of
some interest of societal importance:7"
Absolute privilege is conferred where society's interest in the
free flow of a particular type of information is so strong that
communicators are granted complete immunity from
defamation liability .... Qualified privileges, by contrast, are
conferred when society's interest in encouraging the flow of
certain types of information is strong, but not sufficiently
compelling to warrant protecting persons who defame out
of
76
highly improper motives or in a particularly egregious way.
Accordingly, privileged communication rests on public policy
considerations.77 The absolute privilege applies to statements
7
that society deems so essential they are "impervious to proof."
In fact, "[ciommunications afforded an absolute privilege are
perhaps more appropriately thought of as cloaked with an
immunity, rather than a privilege."7 9 The qualified privilege, in

70 See supra note

16 and accompanying text. Also see the discussion of

BrokerCheck, supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (noting that in some
situations, information from the Form U-5 may be available to the public).

11See infra note

170 and accompanying text.

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 116.
'3 See id.
74 See generally id. § 114-15.
71 See id. § 114, at 815.
76 See Wright, supra note 16, at 1325-26.
71 See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 889
(Minn. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.933(2),
181.962(2) (2006), as recognized in Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp, 880
N.E.2d 1002, 1011 (2007) (holding that a Minnesota statute has superseded Lewis on
the doctrine of compelled self-defamation).
78 See Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 89 A.D.2d 164, 168, 454 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904
(2d Dep't 1982), rev'd on othergrounds, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 211, 451 N.E.2d 182, 185, 464
N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (1983) (quoting Stukuls v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 275, 366 N.E.2d
829, 831, 397 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Toker v. Pollak, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 218, 376 N.E.2d 163, 166, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4
(1978).
72
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contrast, applies to communications that may not necessarily
merit absolute immunity but still warrant protection from
malice. 0
The absolute privilege is implemented in those rare
instances where "there is an obvious policy in favor of permitting
complete freedom of expression without any inquiry as to the
defendant's motives."8' Virtually all jurisdictions agree that
statements made in judicial proceedings are one such instance.82
In this limited situation, an absolute immunity will protect the
"robust, adversarial litigation process [that] is deemed so
essential to the American form of government, and depends so
heavily on relevant information being brought into court ....
This privilege ensures that governmental officials can carry out
their duties without fear of a defamation suit, which could inhibit
their public function to speak freely. 84 Additionally, absolute
immunity protects statements made by all persons regardless of
their governmental status as long as they were "integral parts of
the judicial process."8 5 "The law gives to all who take part in
judicial proceedings, judge, attorney, counsel, printer, witness,
litigant, a right to speak and to write, subject only to one
limitation, that what is said or written bears upon the subject of
litigation." 6
Based on the above reasoning, some courts have extended
absolute immunity to quasi-judicial proceedings.8 ' A proceeding
is traditionally determined quasi-judicial when it implements
"procedures like those used in judicial proceedings to ensure the
integrity and good faith of its participants.
Such judicial
safeguards include notice provisions, the opportunity to request a
hearing, the judge's control over the proceeding, the opportunity

80 See Park Knoll, 89 A.D.2d at 168-69, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05; see also infra

notes 90-91 and accompanying text (defining malice).
" See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 684 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra
note 64 at § 114).
82 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 27, at 1021.
8 Id.
84 See Toker, 44 N.Y.2d at 219, 376 N.E.2d at 166, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
85 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).
6

Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 89 A.D.2d 164, 170, 454 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (2d

Dep't 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 211, 451 N.E.2d 182, 185, 464

N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
87

See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 2:5 (2008).
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for appellate review, and the threat of prosecution for perjury."8 8
Nevertheless, the absolute privilege will only apply if the
statement is "at all pertinent to the litigation." 9
In contrast to the absolute privilege, a qualified privilege
entitles the speaker to some degree of immunity; however, this
privilege will be lost if the speaker abuses that immunity.90 The
qualified privilege will not protect the speaker if he acted with
common law malice (ill will, spite, vindictiveness, or revenge) nor
will it protect the speaker if the plaintiff proves actual malice
(reckless disregard for the truth).9 1
III. THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF NEW YORK'S APPLICATION OF
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Whether an absolute or qualified privilege applies to the
Form U-5 is a hotly contested issue that has evaded uniform
resolution. These non-uniform laws permit a broker in one state
to secure redress but bar another in a different state from an
identical claim on the same Form U-5. 92 Thus, brokerage firms
that have offices around the country are subject to different
liability standards.9 3 Moreover, not only is there disagreement
among the states, but decisions within a state often conflict. 94
8' See Orenstein, supra note 27, at 264 (noting that although "[miost states have
incorporated some version of the quasi-judicial doctrine into their defamation
law... there is no uniform standard by which courts define what is quasi-judicial").
19 Mosesson v. Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Firm, 257 A.D.2d 381, 382, 683 N.Y.S.2d
88, 89 (1st Dep't 1999). According to most courts, this pertinence requirement can be
satisfied by a standard of good faith with all doubts resolved in favor of the
defendant. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 114; see also Ginsburg v. Black, 192
F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1951) (noting that the test is whether the matter has
reference and relation to the subject matter of the action, rather than whether the
matter is legally relevant); Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1945)
(noting that "the privilege embraces anything that may possibly be pertinent")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Dover, 143 S.W.2d 1112, 1113 (Ark.
1940) (stating that "[iut is sufficient if the words are uttered under an honest belief
that they are relevant and pertinent, whether they are so in fact or not").
90 JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 27, at 1023-24.
9' Id. at 1024-25.
92 See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 676.
93 See id. Accordingly, although an absolute privilege may protect an employer's
statements in a company's New York branch, a qualified privilege may only attach
to an employer's statements in that company's Chicago office.
94 See Ralph DeSena, 'Rosenberg' Is Big Victory for Securities Firms, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 9, 2007, at 4 (noting that the Rosenberg case settled the long debate concerning
whether a qualified or absolute privilege applies to the Form U-5 under New York
law).
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New York is a prime example. 5
Indeed, just days before
Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc. upheld an absolute privilege, New
York courts affirmed two arbitration awards allowing securities
dealers to recover damages under a qualified privilege.9 6
Although New York's application of the absolute privilege
represents the minority view,9" New York's decision is significant
given that New York is "the heart of the securities industry in
the United States."" New York City accounts for 90% of all
securities jobs in the state and more than 22% of securities jobs
in the nation.9 9 In fact, the New York metropolitan area provided
230,000 jobs in the securities industry in 2006, far more than any
other city.1"' Wall Street alone accounted for 41% of the jobs
gained in New York City between 2003 and 2006.101

9' See infra, notes

119-120.
" See DeSena, supra note 94, at 4. Judge Loretta Preska affirmed a $12.5
million arbitration award to three Merrill Lynch brokers for their "pain and
suffering" resulting from the firm's defamation on their U-5s. Id. Likewise, an NASD
panel awarded a judgment on a U-5 defamation claim to a discharged representative
whose Form U-5 noted that he had engaged in the sale of hedge fund products and
was also aware that a market timing relationship existed with a third party. Id.
(citing In re Schaffran v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 04-06498, 2007 WL
1001079 (N.A.S.D.) (Mar. 21, 2007) (Barak, McDonnell & Chiusano, Arbs.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
97 See Terry Weiss & Nathan Chapman, Permission To Be Frank? The Debate
Continues over an Absolute Versus Qualified Immunity in U5 Defamation Cases, 39
SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 881, 881 (2007), available at http://www.sutherland.coml
files/PublicationI84717058-65fd-48bb-9607-909e9cffd434/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/6daf89l9-d097-43ac-adO2-522108cd0d67/BNA.pdf (noting that before
the Rosenberg case was decided, the "only state that accorded absolute immunity to
Form U5 disclosure outside New York was California").
" See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN NEW
YORK CITY 10 (Oct. 2007), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/osdc/rpt5-2008.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009).
9 Id. at 7.
100Id. at 10. Other than New York, Chicago and Boston have the largest
concentrations of securities jobs, each providing around 46,000 jobs in 2006. Id.; see
also Jon Jacobs, Fed on Paycheck Destruction in N. Y., SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS (Oct. 23,
2008) (stating that "[elach New York securities industry job is estimated to generate
2.3 other jobs in fields such as legal services, software development, and real estate,
as well as other services like hotels and restaurants"), http'//news.careerzone.
securitiesindustry.comITEMFR/newsItemld-15671.
101 See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, supra note 98, at 1.
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The Cases That Led to New York's Application of the Absolute
Privilege

Prior to Rosenberg, New York case law on this issue was in
complete disarray. Two key decisions, Fahnestock & Co., v.
Waltman 10 2 and Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck,' initiated the
chaos. 10 4 These cases were decided within two months of each
other, and each applied a different privilege-the former
advocating for a qualified privilege and the latter favoring an
0 5
absolute privilege.
Recognizing that New York typically attaches a qualified
privilege
to communications
concerning
an employee's
termination, the district court in Fahnestock refused to grant
absolute immunity to a brokerage firm that maliciously defamed
its employee.0 6 Fahnestock & Co. had hired Joseph Waltman to
head its Retirement Trust Division and subsequently terminated
him six years later when the firm closed the division.' 7
Accordingly, Waltman's Form U-5 stated that he was terminated
due to "business consolidation."'0 8 After the company could not
locate some insurance files it believed Waltman possessed, it
changed its answer from "no" to "yes" in response to a question
inquiring whether the employee was under "internal review for
fraud or wrongful taking of property."'0 9 The court found
Fahnestock & Co. liable for displaying "flagrantly spiteful
conduct, demonstrating its intent simply to injure Waltman's

935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
A.D.2d 689, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1st Dep't 1991).
Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 516 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Rosenberg v. MetLife,
Inc., 453 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2006), affd, 493 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2007) (contending
that Fahnestock does not "definitively stand for the proposition that, under New
102

103 175
104 See

York law, Form U-5 statements are entitled to a qualified privilege" but that the

Fahnestock court simply gave deference to the arbitrator's decision and held that it
"was not in manifest disregard of New York law").
105 Compare Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 516, with Herzfeld, 175 A.D.2d at 691, 572
N.Y.S.2d at 685. Fahnestock was decided in June 1991, and Herzfeld was decided in
August 1991.
106 See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 CIV. 1792, 1990 WL 124354, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1990), affd, 935 F.2d at 519 (citing Greenfield v. Kanwit, 546 F.

Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
107

See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 514.

108 Id.
109 Id.
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reputation."110 As a result of this malice, the qualified privilege
did not protect the language on Waltman's Form U-5, and
Waltman was entitled to compensatory damages."'
Conversely, Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck," 2 decided only
two months after Fahnestock, applied an absolute privilege."
The court in Herzfeld focused on the Form U-5's role in initiating
an investigation." 4 The Court found that the "New York Stock
Exchange and, specifically, its Department of Enforcement
clearly perform as a quasi-judicial body" given that the NYSE is
authorized to inquire into a broker's misconduct." 5 Moreover,
the court held that because the process is "adversarial in nature"
and affords the individual the right to appeal, "it certainly
conforms to the requirements of a quasi-judicial administrative
proceeding."" 6 The court therefore concluded that the absolute
privilege attached not only to the information supplied in the
investigation but to the actual Form U-5 that prompted the
investigation." 7 Consequently, the court barred any recovery
regardless of the malice alleged."'
As a result of these conflicting cases, it remained uncertain
which privilege applied. Some arbitrators continued to follow the
Fahnestock decision and applied a qualified privilege," 9 while

"1

Id. at 516.

111 Id. at 515. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant
compensatory damages but vacated the punitive damages, holding that "the
Arbitrators were prohibited from awarding punitive damages." Id.
112 175 A.D.2d 689, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1st Dep't 1991).
113 See Wright, supra note 16, at 1322 (noting that Herzfeld reached the opposite
conclusion after devoting no discussion to the Fahnestock decision).
114 Herzfeld, 175 A.D.2d at 691, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
115Id.

Id.
Id.
1I1Id. at 690-91, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85.
119See Acciardo v. Millennium Sec. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (upholding an arbitrator's decision to award a broker damages under a
qualified privilege). Here, a New York stockbroker alleged that the defamatory
language on his Form U-5 resulted from his refusal to "look the other way" or
otherwise participate in his employer's regulatory fraud. Id. at 415. The broker
proved that his employer acted with malice and prevailed because "[tihe shield
provided by a qualified privilege... dissolve[s] if [a] plaintiff can demonstrate that
[the] defendant spoke with 'malice.'" Id. at 421 (quoting Lieberman v. Gelstein, 80
N.Y.2d 429, 437, 605 N.E.2d 344, 349, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 862 (1992)). The court
affirmed the award of $100,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 422.
116
117
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others followed the Herzfeld decision and applied an absolute

immunity. 120
B.

The Case That Resolved the Conflict

Rosenberg resolved the uncertainty by mandating an
absolute privilege. 121
In Rosenberg, a New York broker's
employer accused him of accepting unauthorized third-party
checks. 22 As a result of this accusation, his employer wrote on
his Form U-5: "Appeared to have violated company policies and
procedures involving speculative insurance sales and possible
accesory [sic] to money laundering violations."12' 3 In response, the
broker submitted a statement that he was "terminated solely on
account of the fact that [he is] a Hassidic Jew."1 24 This response
also appeared on his Form U-5. 25
Upholding an absolute
privilege, the trial court ignored the broker's discrimination

defense. 126
The court based its holding on two premises: (1) the Form U5 is a preliminary step in the NASD's quasi-judicial process, and
therefore deserves, the absolute immunity traditionally afforded

120 See Cicconi v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 27 A.D.3d 59, 62, 808 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607
(1st Dep't 2005) (relying on Herzfeld and concluding that the Form U-5 is protected
by an absolute privilege). The court balanced the interests of the employer and
employee and concluded that the assurance of an employer's accurate disclosure
outweighed the harm to individual employees from defamatory language. Id. at 63,
808 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
121 Id.
The court contended that Fahnestock does not mandate that the Form U-5
is subject to a qualified privilege but simply states that the arbitrators' decision to
apply a qualified privilege was not in manifest disregard of New York law. Id. at
125.
122 See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 363, 866 N.E.2d 439, 441, 834
N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (2007).
123 See FINRA BrokerCheck Report for Chaskie Jacob Rosenberg, http://broker
check.finra.org/Individual/IndividualSummary.aspx?SearchGroup=Individual&Firm
Key=-1&BrokerKey=2933320 (click on "View Full PDF Report") (original text
appears in all capital letters).
124 Id.; see also Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 364, 866 N.E.2d at 442, 834 N.Y.S.2d at
497 (noting that, although the district court denied MetLife's motion to dismiss the
discrimination claims, the jury nevertheless found MetLife not liable for
discrimination).
125 See FINRA BrokerCheck Report for Chaskie Jacob Rosenberg, supra note
123.
12 See Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 364, 866 N.E.2d at 442, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
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to judicial proceedings; 2 7 and (2) an absolute privilege protects
the general investing public against the harm caused by
128
unethical brokers.
To support its first foundation, the court noted that the
absolute privilege has traditionally protected statements made in
The court then
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.'2 9
maintained that the Form U-5 is a preliminary step in the
NASD's quasi-judicial process given that the filing of the Form
U-5 is a compulsory requirement and often serves as "the first
indication that the NASD receives regarding possible
misconduct." 30 As a result, the court concluded that the Form
U-5 warrants absolute immunity.' 3 ' In further support of this
conclusion, the court analogized the filing of the Form U-5 to the
submission of a complaint with the grievance committee of a bar
association, which the court previously determined was
32
absolutely privileged.
To support its second premise, the court focused primarily on
policy concerns. The court noted that the absolute privilege is
the only standard that can effectively "enable the NASD to
investigate, sanction and deter misconduct by its registered
representatives." 3 3 Furthermore, the court argued that the
absolute privilege best serves the NASD's objectives to ensure
accurate and truthful responses on the Form U-5.1'3 In an effort
to assuage the harsh reality of its decision, the majority noted
that those who are maliciously defamed are not completely
without a remedy, as a broker may commence135 an arbitration
proceeding to expunge the defamatory language.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pigott reminded the court that
the absolute privilege is "afforded in very few situations." 36 The
dissent disagreed with the majority's contention that the Form
U-5 acts as a preliminary step in a quasi-judicial process: "[T]he
majority's holding provides an absolute privilege to statements
Id. at 366-67, 866 N.E.2d at 443-44, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 498-99.
Id. at 367-68, 866 N.E.2d at 444, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
129 Id. at 365, 866 N.E.2d at 442, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
130 Id. at 367, 866 N.E.2d at 444, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
131Id. at 368, 866 N.E.2d at 444, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
132 Id. at 365-66, 866 N.E.2d at 443, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
133 Id. at 367-68, 866 N.E.2d at 444, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
" Id. at 370, 866 N.E.2d at 446, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
135 Id. at 368, 866 N.E.2d at 445, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
136 Id. (Pigott, J., dissenting).
127
128
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made on a Form U-5 where no judicial or even 'quasi-judicial'
proceeding is even contemplated." Further, "Itihe submission of
the Form simply does not represent a preliminary or
investigative stage in any quasi-judicial process"'3 7 but merely
serves to notify the NASD "of a change in an employee's
registration status." 13
Moreover, the dissent argued that the qualified privilege
satisfies the majority's policy concerns.3 9 Given that a broker
can only overcome the privilege by showing that the statements
were made with malice, the qualified privilege offers the
employer "strong protection." 14 0
The qualified privilege,
therefore, suits the financial industry's need for accurate and
truthful disclosure; yet, unlike the absolute privilege, does not
provide the brokerage firm with carte blanche power to defame
its brokers.' 4 '
IV. THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE SATISFIES THE INTERESTS OF ALL
PARTIES

The qualified privilege balances the interests of the employer
and employee.
In contrast, Rosenberg renders the broker
seemingly defenseless against his employer's absolute immunity
to defame him. The qualified privilege represents the majority
view among the states, signifies a filing formality that does not
warrant the protection of an absolute immunity, and satisfies
policy concerns by balancing the needs of the employer and
employee. 142
Moreover, the Form U-5 is analogous to an
employment reference, which the United States has long afforded
a qualified privilege. 43 Additionally, two Model Code provisions

137 Id.

at 369-70, 866 N.E.2d at 446, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
,31 Id. at 369, 866 N.E.2d at 445, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 500. The dissent distinguished
the filing of a grievance committee complaint from the filing of a Form U-5 on the
basis that the Form U-5 serves an informative, "primary purpose" that is publicly
displayed. Id. The filing of a complaint to a grievance committee, by contrast, is
confidential. Id.; see also supra note 6 (explaining that FINRA took over the NASD).
139 Rosenberg, 8. N.Y.3d at 370, 866 N.E.2d at 446, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
140

Id.

See id. at 370-71, 866 N.E.2d 446-47, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
143 See infra Part IV.D.
141
142
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Accordingly, a uniform
sanction such limited immunity. 144
qualified privilege best serves the realities of the workplace and
should attach to the Form U-5.
A.

The Absolute Privilege Is a Minority View

Although Rosenberg made the absolute privilege the binding
rule in New York, the majority of states adhere to a qualified
privilege. 4 5 In fact, California is the only other state to apply an
absolute immunity.146 Baravati v. Josephthal Lyon & Ross,
one of the most widely cited decisions in favor of the
Inc.,
qualified privilege, best summarizes the reasons why many
states apply a qualified privilege to the Form U-5.14 s The
Seventh Circuit put the brokerage firm's dilemma into
perspective: "[If [members] state a reason [for termination]
discreditable to the employee they may be sued for libel while if
they lie about the reason they will be violating the association's
rules."1 49 The Seventh Circuit nonetheless determined that the
filing of the Form U-5 is not a stage in the NASD's quasi-judicial
regulatory process but "the means by which the NASD
administers an employment clearinghouse." 150 Hence, the form
simply serves an informative purpose: providing "potentially
valuable information concerning the availability and suitability
See infra Part IV.F.
...See infra note 204 (listing states that have adopted the qualified privilege by
statute); infra notes 153-156 (listing states that have adopted the qualified privilege
by judicial decision).
144

146See Lawyer Launches Campaign To Fight U-5 Ruling, COMPLIANCE REP.,

Apr. 13, 2007; see also Fontani v. Wells Fargo Invs., L.L.C., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833,
842-43 (Ct. App. 2005) (applying the absolute privilege to the Form U-5 in
California), overruled in part by Kibler v. N. Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., 138 P.3d
193, 199 (Cal. 2006).
147 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
148See Andrews v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 160 F.3d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1998)
(applying Michigan law); Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,135 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir.
1998) (applying Illinois law); see also Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d
132, 137 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Tennessee law); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton,
929 F. Supp. 1411, 1418 (N.D. Okl. 1996) (applying Oklahoma law and noting that
"Baravatiis the better view"); Wright, supra note 16, at 1314 (noting the significance
of the Baravati decision as one of the seminal cases advocating for a qualified
privilege).
149 See Baravati, 28 F.3d at 708 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

1153 (1993) (art. IV, § 3(a) of the NASD's bylaws)); see also Kavaler, supra note 20, at 703 (noting that an employer's failure to
file a Form U-5 may result in "administrative, civil, and even criminal penalties").
OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL

1"0 Baravati,28 F.3d at 708.
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of potential employees."'5 1 Moreover, the court cautioned that
the "absolute privilege is strong medicine" and does not warrant
extension "beyond the judicial and quasi-judicial context and into
the termination notice." 5 2
55 Arizona, 156
154
Courts in Connecticut,'53 Florida, Oklahoma,
and Texas 15 have all ruled in favor of a qualified privilege. For
example, in Heldmann v. Tate,158 a Connecticut court applied a
qualified privilege to the defamatory language on an employee's
Form U-5 relating to a salary miscalculation. 159
A broker
erroneously computed her ten percent raise by calculating her
annual bonus with her base pay. 160 Her boss did not anticipate
161
the inclusion of the bonus and fired her for the miscalculation.
The broker's Form U-5 stated that she "intentionally and
calculatedly misappropriat[ed] funds which were under her
control," an allegation tantamount to theft. 162 Concluding that a
report sent to a broker-dealer did not qualify as a quasi-judicial
proceeding, the court applied a qualified privilege and denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment.'6 3

151

Id.

Id.
See Dickinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d
247, 262 (D. Conn. 2006) (applying Connecticut law); see also Galligan v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., No. 389623, 2000 WL 1785041, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2000);
Heldmann v. Tate, No. CV 9559122S, 1999 WL 353476, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
20, 1999).
14 See Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v. Ulrich, 692 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (applying Florida law).
155 See Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1418 (N.D. Okl. 1996)
(applying Oklahoma law).
15 See Wietecha v. Ameritas Life Ins. Corp., No. CIV 05-0324-PHX-SMM, 2006
WL 2772838, at *11 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2006) (applying Arizona law).
157 See Wakefield v. SWS Sec., Inc. (In re Wakefield), 293 B.R. 372, 385 (N.D.
Tex. 2003) (holding that statements on a Form U-5 are afforded a qualified
immunity); see also ContiCommodity Servs., Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that under Texas law, an employer's comments about an employee to
an interested person are protected by a qualified privilege).
152

15

8 1999 WL 353476.

Id. at *1.
Id.
161 Id.
159
160

162

Id.

163

Id. at *2.
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The Filingof the Form U-5 Is Simply a Formality

The Form U-5's filing requirement is too far removed from a
judicial proceeding to form a "step" in a quasi-judicial proceeding.
Although some courts may argue that the privilege applies to
"every step" of the judicial proceeding,'6 mere informational
filings are not part of the quasi-judicial process. For example, it
is true that the filing of a police report can lead to an
investigation and initiate a judicial proceeding; 165 however, the
majority of states nevertheless hold that the filing of such a
66
report is only protected by a qualified privilege.
The absolute privilege should not attach to the Form U-5 for
the same reasons it does not attach to the filing of a police report.
Although there is a vital public interest in ensuring that
individuals report crimes to the police, there must also be
sufficient protection of the accused's reputational interest.
Likewise, there is a public interest in ensuring that the investing
public has accurate and complete knowledge about its investors.
Moreover, "[tihe countervailing harm caused by the malicious
destruction of another's reputation by false accusation[s]" 6 7 from
a false police report is no different than a false U-5 statement
alleging employee misconduct.
Both result in "irreparable
" 68
69
and the resultant loss of job
consequences, 1 including shame
14 Herzfeld & Stern, Inc. v. Beck, 175 A.D.2d 689, 691, 572 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685
(1st Dep't 1991).
165See Peter Zablotsky, From Undermining Child Protection Statutes To
Creating Exceptions to Prohibitions Against Racial Discrimination in Public
Accommodations: The Unsettling Consequences of Mischaracterizing the Police
ReportingPrivilege, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 317, 326 (2006).
16 See id. at 325. "[A] qualified privilege is 'sufficiently protective of [those]
wishing to report events concerning crime'.... There is no benefit to society or the
administration of justice in protecting those who make intentionally false and
malicious defamatory statements to the police." Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d
65, 69 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Fridovich v. Fridovich, 573 So. 2d 65, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990), rev'd, 598 So. 2d 65). In fact, an absolute privilege might actually entice
the filing of malicious police reports. See DeLong v. Yu Enters., 47 P.3d 8, 9-10 (Or.
2002) (applying a qualified privilege to an employee's defamation action against his
employer for statements published on a police report). The employer had fired the
employee after a heated dispute and filed a police report against the employee
without cause. Id. at 9. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defamed
employee. Id.
167 Gallo v. Barile, 935 A.2d 103, 111 (Conn. 2007).
168 Id.
169 See

Murray Schwartz, Davida S. Perry, Daren L. Hensley & Alexander M.
Jeffrey, Claims for Damage to an Employee's Reputation and Future Employment
Opportunities, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
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opportunities.170 Furthermore, the filing of a police report serves
an informational purpose: To report a crime. It represents a
mere filing requirement that is too far removed from the actual
judicial proceeding to warrant the same immunity traditionally
afforded to such proceedings. The filing of a Form U-5 likewise
represents such formality-the simple purpose of informing
FINRA of a "change in an employee's registration status."1 7 1
The New York Court of Appeals in Rosenberg failed to
recognize the Form U-5's informative purpose when it analogized
the filing of the Form U-5 to the filing of a complaint with a
grievance committee. 172 The primary reason why New York
affords a grievance complaint an absolute privilege is because it
was originally presented to a court and was only later delegated
In contrast, complaints of
to a grievance committee. 7 3
misconduct on the Form U-5 are not intended to come before a
general court.'7 4 The Form U-5 simply serves as a compulsory
requirement to demonstrate a change in the broker's registration
status, regardless of whether or not misconduct is alleged. 7 5 As
a result, a majority of the Form U-5 filings stem from a broker's
voluntary decision to leave his employment and do not lead to an

PRACTICE

COURSE

HANDBOOK

SERIES:

LITIGATION

745,

755-56

(1999)

("Psychological losses as a result of a wrongful termination have been
documented ....[T]he most significant and debilitating form[] of damage... is that
the employee always carries the stigma of dismissal.").
170Id. at 755 (noting that a "wrongfully dismissed employee may face a reduced
lifetime earning capacity in comparison to other employees with similar credentials
and characteristics").
171 See Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 369, 866 N.E.2d 439, 445, 834
N.Y.S.2d 494, 500 (2007) (Pigott, J., dissenting).
172 Id.
at 365-66, 866 N.E.2d at 443, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (majority opinion).
Many states apply an absolute privilege to complaints alleging attorney misconduct
but nevertheless apply a qualified privilege for defamatory language on the Form U5. See, e.g, Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1998); Field v. Kirton, 856 F.
Supp. 88, 96 (D. Conn. 1994) (applying Connecticut law); Drummond v. Stahl, 618
P.2d 616, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Muck v. Van Bibber, 621 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
173 See Weiner v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 331, 239 N.E.2d 540, 541, 292
N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (1968) (stating that "complaints charging professional misconduct
of an attorney which, in the past, were presented to the General Term of the
Supreme Court are now usually filed with the Grievance Committee of a bar
association" (citation omitted)).
174 See supra note 63. Although statements on the Form U-5 may be arbitrated,
this constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding at most.
175 See Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 369, 866 N.E.2d at 446, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501
(Pigott, J., dissenting).
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investigation. 1 76 In contrast, the grievance committee is only
instituted when misconduct is alleged. Accordingly, the purpose
of the Form U-5 is informational while the purpose of the
grievance committee is disciplinary.
Moreover, the Form U-5, unlike a complaint to a grievance
committee, 177 acts as an employment reference. 178 Therefore,
even assuming that an absolute privilege attaches to participants
in FINRA investigations in the same manner as the privilege
attaches to judicial proceedings, this privilege does not stretch so
far as to cover a mere informative document.17 9 The submission
of a Form U-5 more closely resembles "an employment
clearinghouse" through which member firms can obtain
information regarding potential employees. 8 0 Although it is true
that this form can initiate an investigation or even operate as
evidence in a disciplinary proceeding against the broker, "any
item of information could do that." 8" Besides, "the vast majority
of the Forms, being merely informational, do not result in action
on the part of any regulatory agency. "182
C. Public Policy Favorsa Qualified Privilege
The qualified privilege is the "wiser policy" that "adequately
protects the interests of all parties concerned.' 118 The qualified
privilege balances the broker's reputational interest, the
176 See id.
at 369, 866 N.E.2d at 445-46, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01 (Pigott, J.,
dissenting).
117 See id. at 370, 866 N.E.2d at 446, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Pigott, J., dissenting)
(noting that, in contrast to the confidential statements heard in the attorney's
grievance committee, the Form U-5 is "widely disseminated" and, therefore, can
unfairly penalize an employee in seeking new employment).
178 See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
179 See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1994).
180 Id.; see infra Part D (explaining that the U-5 serves as an employment
reference).

181 Baravati,28 F.3d at 708.

182 Rosenberg, 8 N.Y.3d at 369, 866 N.E.2d at 445-46, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01
(Pigott, J., dissenting). Richard Pullano, NASD Chief Counsel, reiterated this
informational purpose when he urged brokerage firms not to "camouflage" their
explanations as to why a representative left the firm: "It doesn't matter if you've left
the firm voluntarily, been fired or retired, the firm has to submit the U-5 to
regulators within 30 days .... The notification lets regulators know that registered
representatives have left the firm,... but also, and more importantly, why the
person left." See Regulator Warns Firms To Explain Why Reps Leave, COMPLIANCE
REP. (May 5, 2006) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted).
'83 Dawson v N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998).
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"securities regulators' need for accurate and complete
information" regarding the employment history of "problem
representatives," and a "broker-dealer['s] desire for protection
against civil liability for good-faith errors in Form U-5
reporting.""s
The qualified privilege assures individuals that
"securities firms do not have free rein to report customer
complaints in any way they like, exaggerating complaints or
inventing them wholesale with absolute immunity to do so."185
The qualified privilege, a standard above negligence but short of
absolute immunity, best meets the needs of all parties.
In contrast, an absolute immunity provides employers with
an incentive to use the Form U-5 to retaliate against departing
employees. l 6 For example, in Svigos v. Merrill Lynch,8 7 Merrill
Lynch fired an Illinois broker, but nonetheless told him that he
would have a "clean" U-5.111 Indeed, his original Form U-5 stated
that his termination was "voluntary."8 9 The employer altered
this language when the employer discovered that he was seeking
employment at a competing brokerage firm.1 90 Consequently,
Merrill Lynch changed his form to state that he was under
"internal review" and that "Mr. Svigos was terminated after it
came to management's attention that Mr. Svigos had violated a
Firm directive which did not involve customer accounts."'191
Applying a qualified privilege, the court awarded the broker
damages and ordered Merrill Lynch to amend the form to state a
"misunderstanding with superiors" as the reason for

termination. 192
In states employing the absolute privilege, these damages
would not be available. With an absolute privilege in place,
employers have no incentive to provide good-faith, accurate
responses. An absolute privilege will effectively "insulate the
members from liability for the contents of their U-5s [and] would
be tantamount to allowing a member of the NASD to blackball a
184 Cicconi v. McGinn, Smith & Co., Inc., 27 A.D.3d 59, 65, 808 N.Y.S.2d 604, 609
(1st Dep't 2005) (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (quoting Wright, supra note 16, at 1330-31).

1" Dawson, 135 F.3d at 1164.
186

Id.

187 No.
188 See
189

93-04516, 2000 WL 1808278 (Oct. 6, 2000) (Sugarman & Baer, Arbs.).
Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 690 n.17 (discussing the Svigos case).

Id.

190 Id.

191Id. (internal quotations omitted).
192 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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former employee from employment throughout the large sector of
the industry that the membership of the association
constitutes.' 9 3
D. A Qualified Privilege GenerallyApplies to Employment
References
194
The Form U-5 is essentially an employment reference.
Moreover, it is a reference that is not limited to release on
request-a securities employer is required to examine the Form
before making a hiring decision. 9 5 After reviewing the Form,
many employers think twice before hiring a broker with a
disparaging statement on his Form U-5.196 Similar to a negative
employment reference, "any embellishment [on a Form U-51 can
only damage the agent's professional reputation and make the
job hunt more difficult." 197 For example, in Glennon v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.,198 the disparaged broker alleged that as a
result of his employer's defamatory remarks, he could not obtain
a comparable job. 99 The court ruled in the broker's favor and
concluded that it was reasonable to infer "that the difficulty [in
finding employment] was attributable to the publication of the
Form U-5." 0 0 As this case demonstrates, statements provided on
the Form U-5 act as an employment reference to future
employers. Accordingly, given that an employer must review the
form before making a hiring decision, the Form U-5 warrants the
same protection that attaches to general employment
references-a qualified privilege.
Moreover, the qualified privilege benefits the securities
industry by encouraging employers to give complete and accurate
references. With the rise in the prevalence of defamation suits
193Baravati

v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. (analogizing the Form U-5 to "an employer's character reference").
19- See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 678-79.
196 See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 19.
197 Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998); see also
Jordan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining
the irreparable harm that results from a negative Form U-5). "There is no doubt that
[a]
negative Form U-5 will substantially damage
[the employee's]
reputation... [and] [a]s a result, [the employee], who is now deemed an unethical
agent, will have difficulties attracting prospective employers and clients and
maintaining his client base." Id.
19183 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996).
194

199Id. at 138.
200

Id.
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and the judgments recovered from such suits, employers are
overly cautious of providing employee references in fear of costly
litigation. 2°1 As a result, "[r]ather than risk a lawsuit, many
employers have adopted a 'no comment' or 'name, rank and serial
number'" policy. 20 2 In an effort to persuade employers to provide
more material information
than these "no comment"
references,2 3 several states enacted statutes to confer a qualified
privilege on the employer.20 4 These statutes confer a "good faith"
immunity on employers 20 5 and can be rebutted upon a
demonstration of malice.20 6
Additionally, whether or not a state statute has been
enacted, case law in the United States generally "recognizes a
qualified privilege between former and prospective employers as
long as the statements are made in good faith and for a
legitimate purpose. "207 For example, in Wilson v. U.T. Health
Center,0 the Fifth Circuit held that Wilson, a defamed police
officer, presented sufficient evidence to overcome her employer's
qualified privilege. 20 9 After reporting an incident of sexual
harassment against another employee, the officer's employer
reprimanded her for waiting approximately one month to report

201 See John Ashby, Employment References: Should Employers Have an
Affirmative Duty To Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective
Employers?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 126 (2004).
202 See Valerie L. Acoff, Note, References Available upon Request... Not!Employers Are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job References, 17 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 755, 756 (1994).
203 Id.
204 See Frank C. Morris Jr., Workplace Privacy Issues: Avoiding Liability, 1999
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE STUDY 697, 755 (1999) (noting that most states adopted
statutes "codify[ing] the common law qualified privilege"). Such states include:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Louisiana's statute
also affords the employer a qualified privilege; however, the statute grants absolute
immunity to "prospective employers from negligent hiring suits." Id.
205 See id.

208 Id. at 748.

Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 889
(Minn. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.933(2),
181.962(2) (2006), as recognized in Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp, 880
N.E.2d 1002, 1011 (2007).
20 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992).
207

209 Id.

at 1271.
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the harassment.21 0 When she reported an additional instance of
harassment, she was demoted and later fired.211 In retaliation
for her complaints of sexual harassment, the employer portrayed
the officer as a "forger and a liar" in her letter of termination. 2 12
As a result of this retaliation, the employer's statement was not
entitled to qualified immunity, and the employer's summary
judgment motion was denied.2 13 Similarly, in Calero v. Del
Chemical Corp.,24 the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied a
qualified privilege to an employer's false accusation in response
to a prospective employer's request for an employment
reference.21 5 The employer accused a former employee of "hiring
away employees" and stealing confidential records to start his
own business. 21 6' At trial, the employer admitted that these
statements were based on a "pretty well-known office rumor"
that he did not investigate. 217 The court applied a qualified
privilege and affirmed the employee's compensatory and punitive
damages award on the basis that the employer's reckless
disregard for the truth amounted to malice to defeat the
218
employer's qualified immunity.
E.

The Absolute Privilege Provides an Illusory Remedy

The majority in Rosenberg attempted to console defamed
individuals by reminding them that they may bring an
expungement action to remove defamatory statements from their
Form U-5;219 yet, the court failed to recognize the expense and
delay of bringing such action. Expungement is an expensive
210 Id.
at 1266. Wilson was reprimanded for "undress[ing] [herselfi of
responsibility both mentally and administratively by alleging intimidation and by
waiting twenty-eight days before taking any action and/or reporting the incident."
Id. Regardless of this reprimand, the offender was suspended for three days without
pay. Id.
211 Id. at 1266-67. Wilson reported an additional officer's harassment
of two
female employees. Id. at 266. Nevertheless, at a subsequent meeting and a later
trial, this "victim" identified several exaggerations in Wilson's report. Id. This chain
of events prompted her demotion. Id.
212Id. at 1271.
213 Id.
214 228 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 1975).
215 Id. at 744.
216 Id. at 740.
217 Id.
218 See id. at 751.
219 Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 368, 866 N.E.2d 439, 445, 834
N.Y.S.2d 494, 500.
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process, and it is not certain whether brokers will have the
financial wherewithal to bring such an action.22 ° Moreover, by
the time the broker initiates the expungement proceeding, it
might be too late. 221 At this point, the broker may have already
lost all his clients. Furthermore, the victim cannot obtain money
damages, which, in most situations, is the only way to redress
the broker's injury.2 22 Expungement is, therefore, a "pyrrhic"
remedy: 223 If a broker is in fact successful in getting a statement
expunged, he may be out of work for years until the expungement
actually occurs, and the harm at that point may be irreparable.2 2 4
Moreover, the broker's initiation of a "suit against the company
may itself have future detrimental effects [because a] person who
brings suit against a former employer is likely to be a225 less
attractive employment candidate to prospective employers."
Model Codes Hold for a Uniform QualifiedPrivilege
Two model provisions, the NASD's proposal to extend a
qualified immunity to all covered forms 226 and section 507 of the
Uniform Securities Act, also advocate for a uniform qualified
privilege.2 27
In 1998, in response to the number of defamation claims for
alleged untrue or misleading statements made on the Form U-5,
The
the NASD proposed a qualified uniform standard. 8
proposed rule provided for a qualified immunity in arbitration
proceedings for statements made on both Forms U-4 and U-5.229
The NASD balanced the integrity of the Central Registration

F.

See Liddle & Brecher, supra note 10, at 686-87.
See id. at 687.
222 See id.
223 Id.
224 See id.
225 See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 891
(Minn. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.933(2),
181.962(2) (2006), as recognized in Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp, 880
N.E.2d 1002, 1011 (2007).
226 See NASD, supra note 59, at 662. "Covered Forms" include both the Form U-4
and Form U-5. Id.
227 UNIFORM SECURITIEs LAW § 507 (2002).
228 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD Rulemaking:
Qualified Immunity in Arbitration Proceedings for Statements Made on Forms U-4
and U-5 (Apr. 21, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nd9818n.htm (notice that the
NASD had filed a proposed rule that NASD members have qualified immunity in
arbitration proceedings made on the Form U-5 to the SEC).
220

221

229 See NASD, supra note 59, at 659.
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Depository in preserving full and fair disclosure and adequate
protection to employees from statements "designed... to
penalize a departing employee" and came to the conclusion that a
qualified privilege would "strike a balance" between the concerns
of the employer and employee. 230 The NASD also addressed
judicial efficiency concerns and concluded that there is no need to
protect the judicial docket because "the number of defamation
cases relative to the NASD's overall arbitration caseload is
small."23 1
The proposal remained, however, just a proposal and was
never passed. 232
The proposal's failure, nonetheless, is not
attributable to its central premise that the Form U-5 warrants a
qualified immunity, but rather to procedural conflicts based
partly on concerns that the NASD lacked jurisdiction to impose a
uniform standard that differed from local law.233 Nevertheless,
the NASD's efforts were not entirely futile. In 2002, the
commissioners of the Uniform Securities Act proposed a qualified
privilege to Forms U-4 and U-5.234
The Uniform Securities Act is a model act proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL").3 5 Section 507 is a qualified immunity provision
designed to protect broker-dealers from defamation claims on
information filed with the SEC or self-regulatory organization
"unless the person knew, or should have known at the time that
the statement was made, that it was false in a material respect

230 Id. at 662.

See NASD, REGULATION REQUEST FOR COMMENT 97-77, at 661 (1997).
See Curzon et al., NY Court: Broker-DealersImmune from Defamation Suits
Based on Statements in Employment TerminationNotices, DECHERT ON POINT, Mar.
2006, at 1, availableat http://www.dechert.com/library/FS_FSSLUpdate-03-06.pdf.
233 See id.; see also NASD Issues U-5 Immunity Rule, REGISTERED REP., Dec. 1,
1997, available at http://registeredrep.com/mag/finance-nasd issues-immunity/
(also attributing the proposal's failure to criticism over the proposed requirement
that representatives be given a copy of their Form U-5 ten days before filing).
234 See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, § 507 cmt. 7 (2002).
235 See generally UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT. The Act was created by an
organization made up of more than three hundred lawyers, judges, and law
professors appointed to draft uniform state securities proposals to the legislature.
See Press Release, The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws,
New Uniform Securities Act Approved (Aug. 5, 2002), http://www.nccusl.orgnccusl/
pressreleases/pr080502_SEC.asp.
231
232
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or the person acted in reckless disregard of the statement's truth
or falsity."23 6 The commissioners considered and rejected the
application of the absolute privilege:
This Section ... is consistent with most litigated cases to date
and is a response to concerns that defamation lawsuits have
deterred broker-dealers and investment advisers from full and
complete disclosure of problems with departing employees. The
Drafting Committee was also sensitive to the concern that such
immunity could allow broker-dealers and investment advisers
to unfairly characterize employees to protect their "book" of
clients. Because of this concern the Drafting Committee
rejected proposals for an absolute immunity.2 37
Prior to September 2002, immunity decisions were adopted only
through judicial decisions.238
Since 2002, however, fourteen
states and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted section 507 of the
Uniform Securities Act.239 Georgia and Wisconsin have bills
pending to enact the Act in the near future.2 4 °
CONCLUSION
The qualified privilege strikes the appropriate balance
between the securities industry's need for complete and accurate
information and the protection of a broker's reputational interest.
Unlike the absolute privilege, the qualified privilege does not
provide the employer with absolute immunity to defame its
employees. Moreover, given that the broker must overcome the
difficult hurdle of proving malice in order to hold the employer
liable, the qualified privilege still offers the employer adequate
protection. Thus, by granting the employer limited liability, the
qualified privilege adequately protects the broker, employer, and
the investing public.
236 See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 507.
237 See id. § 507 cmt. 6.
238 See id. § 507 cmt. 7.
239 MICH. H.R., SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILLS 5008-5020 AND 5022-5024 AS

REPORTED FROM COMMITTEE (2008) (noting that Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,

Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and the U.S. Virgin Islands incorporated section 507 of the
Uniform
Securities
Act
into
their
state
statutes),
available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billanalysis/House/htm/2007HLA-5008-3.htm.
240 States Issues: Model

MARKETS ASS'N,
uniform.html.

Aug.

14,

Uniform Securites Act, SEC. INDUSTRY AND FIN.

2008,

http://www.sifma.org/legislative/state/model-
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The absolute privilege, by contrast, affords no such
compromise. This complete immunity has been confined to "very
few situations where there is an obvious policy in favor of
permitting complete freedom of expression. "241 Few courts have
extended this privilege to the Form U-5. As the Seventh Circuit
noted in Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., the grant of
an absolute immunity is "tantamount to allowing a member of
the NASD to blackball a former employee."24 2 This protective
shield bars all redress to the employee's tarnished reputation and
ultimately provides employers with carte blanche power-in
essence, a "license to lie."

241
242

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 114.
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 1994).

